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This article argues that the origins 
of the Greek malaise are primarily 
political rather than economic and 
rooted in the delay, postponement, 
and half-hearted implementation of 
public policy reforms that preceded 
the crisis. The 2007-08 global 
economic crisis triggered market 
scrutiny over Greece, as it brought 
to an end a period of abundant 
liquidity and a relaxed attitude by 
global markets vis a vis Eurozone 
members. Greece’s impossible fiscal 
position was brutally exposed, and a 
downward spiral began. The article 
also argues that although Greece set 
itself up for failure, the Eurozone’s 
inability to act swiftly and early, to 
diagnose the problem correctly and 
to combine a policy mix consisting 
of budgetary consolidation and 
policy reform further exacerbated 
the problem. Despite the fact that 
disorderly default has been avoided 
and a sense of normalcy has returned, 
Greece has to move swiftly on the 
reforms front to avoid disaster.
ABSTRACT
The Political Origins of the Greek 
Crisis: Domestic Failures and the 
EU Factor
The 2008 financial crisis led to a rapid downturn of global output. The collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers set in motion dormant forces in the 
lightly regulated financial sector and led 
to a series of bank mergers, nationaliza-
tions and takeovers in the US, the UK 
and elsewhere. The failure of subprime 
mortgages was followed by pressure on 
the official banking sector, and govern-
ments felt compelled to intervene so as 
to rescue the banking system from a 
dangerous and unpredictable collapse. 
For a while, the neoliberal orthodoxy of 
the preceding 30 years came under fire. 
This time, it was not only die-hard so-
cialists who fired at the banks and their 
profit-motivated “greed.” As the crisis 
moved further into to the real economy, 
civil society took up the case of income 
inequality and launched the “99 per-
cent” campaign, highlighting how the 
economic spoils of the present economic 




system are distributed so unevenly as to threaten the stability and reproduction 
of the capitalist system. 
In no other country have the last few years been more traumatic and at the 
same time more revealing that in Greece. An EU member since 1981 and one 
of the world’s thirty richest countries until recently, the Hellenic Republic has 
hit the world’s headlines in an unprecedented manner. The main reason is the 
fact that Greece became the weakest link in the Eurozone chain, with both debt 
and deficit levels at record highs and a record of fiscal imprudence that makes it 
susceptible to collapse. That would have been of little importance to the world’s 
media and markets had Greece not been a Eurozone member; the fact that it is 
makes its possible default an event of severe consequences for the Eurozone as 
a whole, and thus for the global economy. 
In May 2010 and after it had become obvious that the country would be un-
able to keep on borrowing in the open markets on punitive interest rates, Greece 
received a €130 billion rescue package from the IMF and the EU. The goal was 
to bring down public debt levels and consolidate public finances. The program’s 
failure became apparent by late 2011 and a new agreement for a second loan 
worth €110 billion was reached in February 2012. By early March, a bond swap 
deal between Greece and its creditors was successfully concluded, wiping out 
more than €100 billion of Greek debt.1 Meanwhile, the country’s social, politi-
cal and economic system came under severe pressure as EU-IMF conditionality 
imposed drastic cuts on public expenditure, tax rises and flexible labor laws 
to facilitate ‘fire-and-hire’ policies, all in the name of enhancing the country’s 
competitiveness. 
In this paper I will advance two main arguments: first, the origins of the 
Greek crisis are primarily political rather than economic and rooted in the delay, 
postponement and half-hearted implementation of public policy reforms that pre-
cede the crisis. Second, although Greece set itself up for failure, its downward 
spiral was exacerbated by the Eurozone’s inadequacy to act swiftly and early, 
to diagnose the problem correctly and to combine a policy mix consisting of 
budgetary consolidation and policy reform led to a disastrous situation by early 
2012. Following the successful bond swap deal and signs that the EU is now 
willing to combine fiscal consolidation with pro-growth policies, the next few 
months will be crucial in determining whether the Greek economy will be able 
to recover, however modestly, in the next few years. 
In what follows, I will first describe the Greek malaise by use of basic data 
and some facts so as to place the subsequent analysis into context. I will then 
outline the root causes of why past reform failures have now come to bear their 
bitter fruit on the Greek population. To illustrate the argument I will use the case 
of successive failures to reform the pension system, as this policy area is broadly 
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representative of the problem. In the next section, I will link the Greek malaise 
to the EU handling of the crisis since 2009, and the conclusion will summarize 
the main arguments. 
The Greek Crisis: Some Data and Figures 
Greece is not the only country suffering from high debt levels, it is not the only 
country with high public deficit and it is not the only country whose economy 
is contracting.2 Yet it is the only country in which both debt and deficit are at 
record highs, and whose GDP is contracting at record levels. 
To start with, Greece is now going through its 5th consecutive year in reces-
sion and its GDP has shrunk by 13 percent since 2008. The consequences of 
such a dramatic fall in output are stark. Unemployment is now hovering around 
22 percent and is above 50 percent for the young.3 Salary cuts for public and 
private sector workers alike are estimated between 10-30 percent, excluding the 
effects of punitive taxation and tax rises imposed on VAT rates (now at 23 per-
cent for most goods and services). Pensions have been cut by 12 percent in 2011 
and larger cuts are planned for 2012 and the years to come.4 Meanwhile, excise 
duties and special levies on firms, individuals and real estate have been imposed 
a number of times over the last three years on an ad hoc basis, with no obvious 
financial result for state coffers. 
These measures had some positive effect on some macroeconomic indicators. 
The country has managed to reduce its current account deficit from 14.9 percent 
of GDP in 2008 to 9.8 percent in 2011.5 The European Commission suggests 
that the country has recovered around half of the competitiveness lost in 2009-
2011, not least through the reduction in labor costs.6 Note, however, that this 
success was almost entirely due to wage reductions and not any systematic effort 
to reduce the non-wage element in labor costs. Finally, the country’s export rate 
has risen since 2010 and “closed professions” are now liberalized en masse, a 
measure which in theory will offer new employment opportunities and by en-
hancing a more level-foot competition will bring down prices.7
Nevertheless, the country’s debt ratio to GDP has been rising since the crisis 
began, and moved from 116 percent in 2009 to more than 150 percent by 2012. 
The constantly rising debt level totaled more than €360 billion and had become 
unsustainable. In March 2012, the Greek government successfully negotiated a 
debt write-down worth €105 billion, a total of 53 percent reduction of its debt to 
private creditors. This came as part of a package deal that also included the second 
€110 billion bailout, the creation of a special account to deposit debt repayments, 
and an austerity package that alongside privatizations and tax rises foresees cuts 
in pensions, civil service salaries and bonuses, minimum wages, and tax-free 
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thresholds. The goal is to reduce Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio to 120 percent by 
2020,8 a level which itself is not necessarily sustainable in the long run. 
Greece’s Political Economy: Avoiding Change
The Broad Context
Will the second bailout package work? The fact that the transitory coalition gov-
ernment formed in late 2011 and headed by former ECB Vice-President Papade-
mos managed to successfully conclude both the debt write-down deal and tough 
negotiations over a second bailout plan inspires some confidence. Yet successive 
failures by the country’s political elites to address the root causes of the crisis in 
the past mean that Greece’s future remains uncertain.
Severe crises have knocked on Greece’s door in the very recent past, but were 
averted due to a combination of low interest rates, especially after the country’s 
entry in the Eurozone in 2001, liquidity-rich and fairly benign international mar-
kets and the belief that the Maastricht Criteria of 1992 would lead to economic 
convergence across the Eurozone. When the tide turned in 2008 and a lack of 
political leadership in Europe exposed individual member-states’ weaknesses, 
Greece could no longer avoid being singled out as a problematic case. Long-
delayed reforms would now have to be introduced from outside, would not be 
subject to social dialogue or negotiation, and would have to be introduced im-
mediately to reassure markets that the Eurozone remained in control and would 
not break up. In other words, change that should have occurred gradually over 
the last 30 years, in an equitable and preferably progressive manner was continu-
ously blocked, delayed or not implemented. Examples include broadening the tax 
base, tackling sky-high tax evasion and simplifying bureaucracy to enable law 
implementation and efficient service delivery. A brief discussion of the evolution 
of Greece’s post-war political economy will help illustrate the point better.
Greek post-war policy was primarily oriented towards rapid economic devel-
opment whilst seeking monetary stability. The 1953 currency devaluation and 
trade liberalization amidst a relatively stable international economic environ-
ment were very helpful.9 The Greek economy grew on average by 6.5 percent 
between 1950-1961, while growth during the period 1961-1979 was even more 
impressive, 7.4 percent.10 
However, this period is also the one in which high rates of economic growth 
were for the first time accompanied by structural economic problems. First, 
inflation averaged 16 percent between the two oil crises in the 1970s, thus offset-
ting growth rates. Secondly, worsening balance of payments difficulties resulted 
from the slowing down of foreign currency inflows. Thirdly, the commitment 
to monetary and fiscal stability that had underpinned the Greek post-war eco-
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nomic paradigm11 came to an end in the immediate post-dictatorship (post-1974) 
period, as democratic transition made expansionism the preferred pathway to 
legitimize the new regime. The politics of expansionism was enthusiastically 
adopted by the centre-right New Democracy (ND) governments of the 1970s 
(1974-1981), accompanied by nationalizations of select industries. 
The 1980s is the defining decade of modern Greece. The civilianization of 
the regime and democratic consolidation12 went hand in hand with rising aspi-
rations by the middle classes that emerged following the economic upturn of 
the 1950s and 1960s. On the political level, new actors made a powerful entry 
through the 1981 electoral victory of the Socialist Party (PASOK). The latter’s 
call for politics to benefit the “non-privileged” resonated strongly with the vast 
strata of self-employed craftsmen, tradesmen, agricultural laborers and low- and 
middle-ranking state officials.13 However, the economy entered a period of high 
inflation and low growth. Loss of competitiveness in the international market 
was accompanied by the emergence of “ailing industries” bailed out by the state 
for electoral purposes. While the EU sought to encourage liberalization reforms 
in line with its professed plans for a Single Market, the government avoided 
electorally painful economic restructuring. 
To avert disaster, the second PASOK government elected in 1985 briefly ex-
perimented with a program of fiscal consolidation to control a ballooning public 
deficit and rising debt. The consolidation program lasted for only two years and 
was reversed the moment its unpopularity became obvious to the party’s leading 
echelons. Their re-election at stake, they opted for more expansionism, i.e. for 
more public sector expenditure with (in essence) borrowed money. Since EU 
membership guaranteed financial support and contributed to rising living stan-
dards, deficit-financed social policy continued unabated. Meanwhile deindustri-
alization continued and an inefficient services sector grew instead. 
Greece met with political instability in the late 1980s amidst corruption al-
legations and successive electoral contests produced short-lived coalition gov-
ernments. The European Community warned the country that its deteriorating 
economic situation worried Europe, and that measures had to be adopted quickly 
to avert economic catastrophe. It was argued that the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) project could be derailed if Greece’s economic performance did 
not improve.14 In 1990, Greece had an inflation rate of 20.4 percent, a public 
deficit of 15.9 percent and an unemployment rate on the increase standing at 7 
percent.15 At the same time, interest payments by the end of the 1980s had qua-
drupled compared to 1981. 
The seeds for future destruction were sown. By the 2000s, Greece was pro-
ducing little, and even less of its produce was internationally competitive. Its 
product, service and labor markets were ossified and its entrepreneurial spirit 
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hidden underneath a large, bureaucratic monster fed by successive center-right 
and center-left governments. It taxed labor income at punitive rates, while its 
labor productivity was in decline. It had failed to invest in education and R&D, 
thus artificially maintaining healthy growth rates through a construction boom 
fuelled by the 2004 Olympic Games. 
Data confirms this. The country ranked 78th in Transparency International’s 
2010 annual report,16 squeezed between Colombia and Lesotho.17 Moreover, 
it ranked 100th for 2012 in the Doing Business Data released by the World 
Bank Group. Note that the average rank of states in the same group as Greece 
(“OECD High Income”) was 29.18
Perhaps more importantly of all, its civil service lacked the digitalization, 
organization and infrastructure to deliver adequate and efficient services to its 
citizens. To illustrate, state authorities had to conduct a survey to find out the 
exact number of civil servants gainfully employed only after the Memorandum 
of Understanding was signed between the Greek state, the EU and the IMF in 
2010.19 This revealed stark discrepancies in civil servants’ salaries, most of who 
were completely arbitrary and did not reflect objective qualifications, such as 
the employee’s education level, IT skills, and so on. When the EU/IMF-Greece 
Memorandum was signed in the spring of 2010, the European Commission set 
up a Task Force for Greece. The EU argued that its establishment was a ‘strong 
gesture of solidarity’ with Greece.20 That is only part of the story, however. 
The formation of the Task Force, whose primary purpose is to offer technical 
assistance to the Greek authorities so as to boost the country’s ability to benefit 
from EU funds and accelerate the pace of administrative reform, is also an in-
stitutional framework underscoring EU pressure to introduce reforms that have 
been postponed or cancelled for decades.
A meritocratic public service ethos was never developed, and party politi-
cal favoritism grew enormously over successive governments, meaning that top 
officials were replaced whenever elections led to a change of government.21 
In some cases, a change of guard would occur with a reshuffling, as Ministers 
would seek to work with their “own.” The result was a dispirited body of civil 
servants, occasionally marred in corruption and never properly assessed in terms 
of its service delivery. 
The democratic achievements of the post-1974 era, such as the democratiza-
tion of the trade unions and the restoration of their legitimate rights and free-
doms, lost their original meaning through time. Instead they became a symbolic 
point of resistance to all kinds of reform, from serious to hasty, from sensible 
to unjust. The positive changes that were introduced in labor relations over the 
1980s and 1990s did not lead to some form of Europeanization of social dialogue 
and negotiated solutions to policy problems.22 Instead, trade unions became an 
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obstacle even to progressive reforms and declined invitations by governments, 
particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s, to find coordinated answers to 
labor market problems. 
The Greek trade unions have for long perceived reform along the lines of 
the “insider-outsider” dichotomy they have helped to sustain, and refused to un-
dertake responsibility for employees outside their core clientele, such as private 
sector employees (unions speak almost exclusively in the name of civil servants) 
women, immigrants, and part-timers. Their approach has offered a perfect alibi 
to a political class addicted to a patron-client relationship with the electorate 
and a reluctance to move ahead with bold change. Often, unionized employees 
in public utility corporations (DEKO), in alliance with party apparatchiks in 
the public sector secured extraordinary privileges for themselves in complete 
disregard for the average employee, and by use of their party connections at the 
highest echelons of the state. There was the odd attempt to remove some of their 
privileges but it was countered by the trade unions’ leadership ability to mobilize 
few but highly influential supporters within the two major parties. 23 
This is not to suggest that political parties or the business world were inno-
cent bystanders: the desire to avoid political cost characterized the former and a 
timid approach complicated by entrepreneurs’ close and often murky relations to 
the state characterized the latter. The end result was a société bloquée,24 where 
sensible policy solutions were rejected until the crisis hit home. 
Reform Failure: The Pension System
To illustrate the source of the country’s inability to change I will use the repre-
sentative case study of the pension system. This is a policy area whose challenges 
(demographics, workers/pensioners ratio, and new patterns of employment and 
social security contributions) are common to all advanced economies, and the 
need for reform dates back to at least the 1990s. Furthermore, the Greek pension 
system is characterized by gross inequities in coverage and benefits, an incoher-
ent decision-making structure, fragmentation and weak budget constraints.25 
The ND government that came to power in 1990 promised to reform the pen-
sion system that was responsible for half the cost of public deficit and absorbed 
15 percent of the country’s GDP.26 Pressure from the EU played into the hands 
of leading government functionaries and could act as a source of empowerment 
in an attempt to entrench a new political economy agenda. In fact, the establish-
ment of the Maastricht criteria led to a broad consensus on the need for EMU 
entry. Yet the ND government failed to introduce radical reform, save for a 
few changes in the retirement age to push the can further down the road. The 
structural deficiencies of the Greek pension system were not addressed27 and 
the changes introduced in the pension system in 1993 amounted to little more 
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than cosmetic modifications. Instead, the government appeased the trade unions 
by watering down its changes and passed the buck to its successor to avoid the 
political cost associated with radical change. 
The re-election of PASOK in 1996 under a new Prime Minister, Kostas Simi-
tis, meant that “modernization” became synonymous with the need to European-
ize (i.e. reorganize, rationalize, and improve according to west European stan-
dards) various facets of public life. During that eight-year period some progress 
was achieved in containing rising debt and deficit levels, and growing prosperity 
combined with sensible management of the economy offered the illusion of long-
term prosperity. Yet the issue of substantial policy reform never went away, as 
the few attempts made to radically alter the country’s stifled political economy 
failed to bear fruit. 
Although the government received expert advice on the need for reform, 
no change was introduced during the 1996-2000 legislative period. Stagnation 
was no longer an option following PASOK’s narrow re-election in 2000. Its 
manifesto called for social security reform, and concurred with the Bank of 
Greece’s warnings of a pension “ticking bomb” threatening to derail the coun-
try’s finances and undermine its ability to compete effectively in the context 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In 2001, the government came 
up with a policy package that tried to deal with some of the pension system’s 
















A poster depicting German Chancellor Merkel and the IMF head Lagarde hangs in front of the Greek 
parliament during an anti-austerity demonstration in Athens’ Syntagma square.
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gross inequities. The Trade Union Confederation (GSEE) immediately attacked 
the proposals and strikes began. Opinion polls took a turn for the worse, while 
the responsible Labor Minister Giannitsis28 could count on no support from his 
colleagues. The minister himself sought to defend his proposals by appealing to 
rationalist arguments but to no avail; he was removed soon after the proposals 
were dropped.29 The law that was passed once Giannitsis had seen the door was 
a significantly “softer” version of the original proposals. Massive resistance to 
change had been manifested yet again and comprised an unusual alliance of party 
traditionalists, trade unions and the highly populist and influential media. 
In the spring of 2008, the ND government unveiled plans to reform the so-
cial security system following its chronic failure. The most significant changes 
included increasing the retirement age, reducing “supplementary” pensions to a 
maximum of 20 percent of basic pension, abolishing early pensions schemes for 
mothers of children under 18 and those employed in public enterprises and banks, 
offering financial incentives for retirement after 60 and merging social insurance 
funds from 133 to 13.30 The social dialogue attempted by the government prior 
to the reform failed to engage the trade unions, as the GSEE accused the govern-
ment of ignoring the financial side of the problem and declined to participate.31 
From the description above it becomes obvious that one of the fundamental 
reasons for policy failure that led to a deep crisis was the vulnerability of Greek 
governments to the granting of exemptions to privileged groups. These groups 
follow the rhetoric of trade unionism and “workers’ resistance to injustice,” 
while their practice points to an inner-circle group of privileged functionaries 
with direct links to both major political parties and the capacity to block much-
needed change in the country’s pension system. 
From Crisis to Tragedy: Slow Responses and Wrong Priorities 
How is it that the Eurozone and its political handlings also share part of the 
Greek tragedy? After all, the financial generosity of Greece’s partners cannot be 
doubted, at least with regard to its volume. Greece is benefiting from a financial 
aid facility and credit line that totals €450 billion: €240 take the form of direct 
loans to the state, €107 billion is worth the haircut deal agreed in March 2012, 
and Greek banks have benefited from €100 billion worth of ECB credit. Ad-
ditionally, the EU has set up credit and rescue mechanisms in the form of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its successor, the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), both of which have been used to assist 
the Greek state. 
Yet there are a few fundamental issues at fault in the EU response to the 
crisis and they ought to be part of the attempt to explain what has gone wrong 
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thus far, specifically in Greece and more generally at the EU level. These could 
be summarized as timing, policy choice and policy content.
Timing
A new PASOK government was elected in Greece in October 2009. A month 
later, it announced that the budget deficit for that year would be 12.7 percent, a 
staggering nine percentage points higher than the previous estimate of 3.7 per-
cent. The market reaction was swift and severe, with Greece being downgraded 
by all major credit rating agencies and eventually reaching “junk” status. Banks 
and other financial institutions started dumping Greek bonds en masse and tur-
bulence in the Eurozone began in earnest. A Eurozone debt crisis erupted soon 
afterwards, as members with similar debt levels such as Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain saw the cost of ensuring their debt against eventual default rise quickly. 
By 2011, the crisis had hit such proportions that both the Greek and Italian gov-
ernments had to resign, and were replaced by administrations headed by Papa-
demos and Monti respectively, both of whom were trusted in Brussels as former 
EU insiders. The cost of having to bail out Italy alongside Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal was prohibitive for the Eurozone. 
Yet the European Council reacted slowly and for a while seemed to think that 
no contagion effect would take place, and that the Greek situation could be man-
aged in slow motion. Although in February 2010 the European Council asked 
Greece to “remove the risk of jeopardizing the proper functioning of Economic 
and Monetary Union,”32 no mechanism was put in place to reassure the markets 
that the Eurozone had a credible solution to the rapidly emerging contagion 
problem. Markets sensed the lack of policy direction and contributed to the esca-
lation of the crisis. By the time that Greece officially requested a rescue package 
in April 2010, the situation was threatening to get out of hand. It was at that mo-
ment that the EFSF was formally put in place.33 Yet even institutional innovation 
was not enough to stem the crisis and the lack of confidence in the Eurozone’s 
determination to deal with the problem. Measures are taken in the last possible 
moment and only after it has become obvious that unless something happens 
quickly the Eurozone may not survive. Last-minute rescue packages have had a 
detrimental effect to the extent they gave the impression that Eurozone did not 
take the problem seriously enough, and was driven to a solution only after its 
very existence came into doubt.34 By the time more decisive action was taken, 
the crisis was firmly implanted and refused to go away. 
Policy Choices 
Slow action was a problem, but is also understandable. First, this was an ex-
traordinary crisis experienced for the first time in the context of the Eurozone. 
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE GREEK CRISIS: DOMESTIC FAILURES AND THE EU FACTOR
93SPRING 2012
Second, Greece was in many respects an unusual case, since it suffered record 
high debt and deficit levels at the same time, while its political class was reluc-
tant to commit to long-term reform and restore even part of its lost competitive-
ness. Finally and more importantly, political time is a lot slower than market 
time. Eurozone states and the EU in general need to take collective, consensus-
based decisions and work out the details of their action in a way satisfactory to 
everyone concerned. Markets, in contrast, decide in seconds in a decentralized 
and often chaotic manner. 
If timing is therefore an understandable weakness, the policy choices un-
derpinning the handling of the Greek crisis are less so. Already in 2010, it was 
obvious that Greece had a mountain to climb and that the combination of very 
high debt and deficit levels called for one of two actions. The EU could have 
decided either to reduce the country’s sovereign debt through early restructur-
ing, or mutualize its debt to make sure that the Eurozone would remain immune 
from contagion.35 
But Germany and France chose to go along both routes with disastrous re-
sults. Until the last rescue package was agreed upon in February 2012, they 
pretended that Greece was essentially solvent, while the markets looked at the 
numbers and foresaw that the country would soon not be able to meet its obliga-
tions. As austerity started to “bite,” strikes and protests caused further havoc to 
an already paralyzed administration and social unrest started to spread through-
out the country.36 An early restructuring of the debt would have prevented its 
continued rise after 2009. 
Debt mutualization could have been another option. Issuing Eurobonds in a 
careful manner entails a series of advantages. First, it makes borrowing more 
credible as it pools the risk that sovereigns now have to bear individually. Sec-
ond, it overcomes the current fragmentation in borrowing practices within the 
Eurozone and offers a political answer to the ability of the markets, exploited to 
the full until now, to pick off the weakest link in the Eurozone chain and attack 
it ferociously. The Eurozone has debt and deficit levels that compare favorably 
to those of the United States, the UK or Japan. Finally, Eurobonds strengthen 
liquidity and offer a potential rival to US Treasury bonds for creditors willing to 
look beyond Washington and branch out their portfolios.37 In addition to Euro-
bonds, the EU could have acted decisively to make the European Central Bank 
(ECB) a lender of last resort to finance state debt. Finally, a European Monetary 
Fund would signal Europe’s determination to tackle the crisis in a systematic 
rather than ad hoc manner. 
Thus the problem here is one of political rather than economic logic. Debt 
mutualization means taking a decisive step towards fiscal union, and that is a 
step too far for the EU. Although new institutions have been created in the midst 
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of the crisis and there is speculation that Eurobonds will have to come sooner 
rather than later, moving towards some kind of economic federation is anathema 
for Europe’s leaders and for many of their constituents. This is particularly 
true for Northern European euro zone members, who have reaped the strongest 
benefits from the Euro’s creation and have augmented their competitive edge, 
not least through labor market reforms in the early 2000s.38 Southern Europe, 
on the other hand, has seen its unit labor costs go up over the last decade and 
the gap between its own performance and that of countries like Germany widen 
further. The latest Commission growth forecast illustrates the point: the Euro 
area is forecasted to contract by 0.2 percent in 2012 but this hides the fact that 
recession will be deep in Greece (around 5 percent), Portugal (around 3 percent) 
and Spain (around 1.5 percent) while Germany and Finland will grow at about 
1.5 percent.39 
Policy Content 
The most important failing of the EU is its policy choice, and to be more pre-
cise, its policy mix. Over the last few years, belt-tightening in the form of sharp 
tax rises and deep cuts in public expenditure have been chosen as the only way 
out of the crisis. This is most obvious in countries like Greece, where belt-
tightening is necessary and a level of austerity was unavoidable considering the 
delays and policy failures outlined above.40 Still, using the need for reform to 
introduce measures that lead to social despair and doubtful economic wisdom is 
no way to exit the crisis. 
A good example is labor relations: in Greece, government has been forced 
to reduce the minimum wage so as to allegedly enhance its competitiveness.41 
Similar reforms have been introduced in Portugal, Spain and Italy. Further re-
ducing the purchasing power of people living on low and very low income does 
little to reignite the economy and foster much-needed growth, as it is doubtful 
that companies will hire more faced with lower labor costs. What it certainly 
does is squeeze the lower-middle and middle classes, sharpening socio-economic 
inequalities in the midst of record-high unemployment and low labor mobility. 
The same policy recipe is used across the EU and is pursued with vigor and 
determination, even where its necessity is doubtful and its results are causing 
distress and further economic problems. As the Eurozone unemployment rate 
reaches 10.8 percent,42 its highest ever, it is clear that the European economic 
and social model, on which the EU prides itself, is in danger.
This policy has led to social reaction and causes continued political instabil-
ity in those countries where the economic situation is worse. Social reaction 
is understandable and very much justified. In most countries, the debt crisis 
was not a debt crisis to start with: it was a private debt crisis that later on be-
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came a public debt crisis through the policies of nationalizations and successive 
bail-outs touched upon in the introduction. Salaried workers and employees see 
their living standards fall without any serious contribution of their own to this 
crisis. Moreover, the arguments in favor of continued austerity and successive 
bank bail-outs only worsen the situation, considering that vast strata of the EU 
population are convinced that politicians and bankers have formed a “rich men’s 
alliance” to protect their own.
The consequences of this are far deeper than lower popularity ratings or a 
change in government. First, they go to the heart of our democratic societies 
to the extent that they help legitimize dangerous generalizations about “corrupt 
politicians” and the “inept political class.” A lack of trust towards democratic 
institutions had already become evident before the crisis began, and had resulted 
from the de facto immunity that politicians have enjoyed until now. The politics 
of austerity (what is more, unjust and indiscriminate austerity) fuels this resent-
ment further and threatens the democratic system of popular representation. It 
does so by allowing people to reach for easy scapegoats as they fail to maintain 
their standard of living. When the scapegoat is not “politicians,” they are often 
the “other,” defined in ethnic or religious terms. Signs of rising xenophobia and 
racist attacks are multiplying in Greece as well as across the EU. The strong 
opinion poll support that far-right parties enjoy is the most obvious piece of 
evidence.
Secondly, the politics of austerity sharpens divisions within the EU between 
the north and south and reproduces unfounded stereotypes about the “lazy” 
southerners. Thus, one of the consequences of the current crisis in the Eurozone 
is to widen the gap of perceptions between Europeans and reinforce pre-existing 
stereotypes that harm the values of respect and tolerance that underpin the EU 
project. The unacceptable and ludicrous portrayals of Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and other senior German politicians in Nazi uniforms by the Greek populist tab-
loid press follows repeatedly aired complaints by northern European politicians 
for “the Greeks” and other southern Europeans to get their house in order and 
behave “responsibly.”43 The fact that France and Germany were among the first 
to violate the terms of the Maastricht Treaty in the mid-2000s amidst sluggish 
growth and high unemployment is thus conveniently brushed aside.
Conclusion 
The Greek crisis is a multifaceted phenomenon. The economic aspect of it is 
obvious and due to the country’s Eurozone it has attracted the world‘s attention. 
Yet it would be a mistake to think that if the country overcomes its financial dif-
ficulties it can afford to go back to its old ways. Rather, the debt and economic 
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crisis is a reflection of much deeper, structural problems relating to the country’s 
malfunctioning political economy. Its stifling bureaucracy, the absence of a size-
able, state-independent entrepreneurial class and factionalist, inward-looking 
trade unions and a political class addicted to patron-client relations have com-
bined to bring the country to the brink of collapse. Although Greece did not 
have high levels of private debt when Lehman Brothers collapsed, its public debt 
levels revealed a political class that got used to financing its way through debt 
accumulation. It is now struggling to come to terms with a harsh reality imposed 
from outside. 
This will have far-reaching political consequences. The next elections, sched-
uled for late April or early May, will be unlike any other in recent memory. 
They will underscore popular frustrations with the two major parties and espe-
cially PASOK, whose former leader and Prime Minister George Papandreou 
has received the bulk of the harsh criticism directed at his handling of the crisis. 
They are also likely to lead to an increase in the number of parties represented 
in Parliament, and are very likely to hinder the winner from forming a single-
party majority government. Single party majority governments have been the 
norm since 1974, but a new culture of consensus-based politics will have to be 
implemented in earnest if the country is to recover. Pro-reformist elements exist 
today across the political spectrum. Their ability to overcome factionalist divi-
sions and work in good faith with one another has today become a precondition 
to exit the crisis in a relatively short period of time.
As the second section of the article sought to make clear and despite the fact 
that Greece is the victim of its own deeds, the political handling of the crisis 
by the Eurozone has been inadequate. Moreover, a one-sided preoccupation 
with budget cuts intensified social tensions and threatened Europe’s social and 
economic model. The good news for Europe is that it has not run out of time; 
focusing on growth and jobs as opposed to one-sided austerity is still feasible as 
well as necessary. 
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